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Abstract 
Brazil has been experimenting with Private Sector Participation (PSP) in the water and sanitation sector in 
various forms since the mid-nineties, one of the most common being concession contracts. Currently, 25% of the 
population is served by companies with private sector participation and this figure could grow to 36% within 10 
years. This paper studies past and ongoing experiences with private provision of water services in Brazil and 
assesses their impact on access and affordability indicators. It also discusses the social policies in place to 
improve those indicators, especially those targeting the poor. It uses different estimation methods and datasets to 
determine whether or not there is any difference in access to water supply and ability to pay water bills between 
municipalities that opted to entrust the provision of water services with private operators and those that kept them 
public. Moreover, whenever possible, the analysis is broken down by income (GDP) deciles in an attempt to 
evaluate the impact of private provision on lower income families. The results obtained entail the conclusion that 
PSP in Brazil has delivered higher access to water services, benefiting mostly the poor. They are inconclusive 
regarding affordability of water services though. 
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Impacts of private sector participation on  
the provision of water services in Brazil 
 
 
1. Introduction 
Up until the 1960’s, the provision of water and sanitation services in Brazil was very deficient, 
lack of appropriate water and sewage treatment, inefficient operation and faulty regulation being the 
norm. Moreover, there were different management models in place. Some municipalities provided water 
and sanitation services independently, while others formed consortia with neighboring municipalities. 
The most successful model was apparently one where state departments were in charge of the entire 
production process, including planning, construction and operation (Turolla 2002). 
Recognizing the close connection between economic and social development and access to basic 
public utility services, the military government instated in 1964 elected as one of its priorities the 
promotion of universal water and sanitation services. One of the actions taken by the government in that 
direction was the creation of the National Housing Bank (BNH) in 1964. Its initial mission was to 
implement an urban development policy, but it was later expanded to include assessing the situation of 
the water and sanitation sector in Brazil and financing of its expansion. 
In order to have access to the financial resources made available by BNH through the Sanitation 
Financial System (SFS), municipalities were required to organize service provision in the form of 
autonomous departments or mixed ownership companies (Turolla 2002). This model resulted in a water 
and sanitation sector where supply of water and sewage services by municipalities was predominant, with 
only a few municipalities relinquishing operation of those services to the state. 
The establishment of the National Sanitation Plan (Planasa) in 1971, however, changed the 
picture. The plan laid out investment schedules for the sector, as well as tariff, credit and other sector 
policies. It also promoted the creation of state water and sanitation companies (CESBs), encouraging 
municipalities to grant long term concessions to those companies in exchange for financial resources 
coming mostly from BNH. This centralization was defended at the time based on two arguments. The 
first one was that there existed economies of scale in large metropolitan areas to be captured and a need 
to reduce planning costs. The second was the alleged need to introduce cross subsidies, whereby more 
profitable regions would finance less profitable ones. 
The incentives faced by the CESBs under Planasa were such that construction and expansion 
plans were privileged, with a detrimental effect on operations (Rezende 1996). Loans from BNH, for 
instance, were not available for activities pertaining to companies’ operations, a consequence of the 
government’s directive to finance the expansion of infrastructure. This eventually resulted in the 
deterioration of water and sewage systems, leading to high system losses. At any rate, coverage of water 
provision in urban areas in Brazil augmented from 60% in 1970 to 86% in 1990 under Planasa, while 
coverage of sewage collection increased from 22% to 48% in the same period of time (Seroa da Motta 
2004).  
By the end of the 1980’s, though, the performance of the highly centralized Planasa system had 
deteriorated significantly. The Brazilian economy was facing a hyperinflationary process which led the 
government to keep companies’ tariffs under tight control in order not to fuel inflation. Dwindling 
investments due to lack of appropriate financing (BNH ceased to exist in 1996 and there was a sharp 
decrease in foreign capital inflow), political meddling and mounting debt service from previous loans 
anticipated a gloomy future for the water and sanitation sector. 
With the monetary stabilization achieved by the Brazilian economy after the “Real Plan” was 
adopted in 1994, the water and sanitation companies tried to recuperate their investing capacity and align 
revenues and costs, to no avail. Inappropriate management practices and lack of incentives for efficiency 
played a significant role in that failure. There was a slight increase in investments in the period 
1994/1998, when weak fiscal controls were in place, but when those controls were tightened up and a 
sound primary surplus received high priority investments dropped sharply. 
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Water supply and sewerage services in Brazil today still reflect the main guidelines established by 
Planasa. The sector is dominated by the regional companies, the CESBs, which still hold concessions 
from municipalities. Municipal provision of water and sanitation services is concentrated mainly in larger 
southern and southeastern states, either through agencies under direct municipal control, autonomous 
agencies or municipal companies. There is a small but significant number of cases corresponding to 
private companies currently holding partial or full municipal concessions. 
Brazil has been experimenting with Private Sector Participation (PSP) in the water and sanitation 
sector in various forms since the mid-nineties, one of the most common being concession contracts. In 
the urban areas, it is estimated that there are some 1,350 water and sewerage entities, of which 32 have 
been privatized (Owen 2006). Currently, 25% of the population is served by companies with private 
sector participation (including cases where private investors are minority shareholders) and this figure 
could grow to 36% within 10 years. 
The main objective of this paper is to study past and ongoing experiences with private provision 
of water services in Brazil and to assess their impact on access and affordability indicators. We will also 
analyze the social policies in place to improve those indicators, especially those targeting the poor.  
We try to determine if there is any difference in access to water supply and ability to pay water 
bills between municipalities that opted to entrust the provision of water services to private operators and 
those that kept them public. Moreover, whenever possible, we break down the analysis by income (GDP) 
deciles in an attempt to evaluate the impact of private provision on lower income families. 
In order to do that, we use a series of different estimation methods and two datasets. The 
investigation of the impact of private provision on access is twofold. First we use a panel containing 
mostly financial and operational indicators, at the municipality level, to estimate panel data models where 
access rates are explained by a dummy for private provision of water service and other variables. Ideally, 
we should be able to include household characteristics in the model, but the household surveys published 
by IBGE, the Brazilian Institute of Geography and Statistics, omit information on the municipality where 
the household is located. It is, however, possible to carry out an analysis of the type “control and 
treatment” using a difference-in-differences estimator. The control group is composed of the 
municipalities that did not privatize their water service, whereas the treatment group is comprised of 
those who did. That is our second approach to the problem, for a panel data set of two years, 1991 and 
2000, with the data coming from the Brazilian censuses. The investigation of how private participation 
affects affordability, however, is limited to the first data set, for there are no affordability indicators 
available in the censuses. 
The paper is divided in seven sections, including this Introduction. In the second section we 
provide, as background, an account of the recent evolution of the sanitation sector in Brazil, with 
particular interest in the participation of private capital. Section 3 looks at social policies and regulation 
and describes in some detail the specific programs implemented in the country. Section 4 discusses some 
indicators of access to and affordability of water supply in Brazil that bear out the main problems in the 
sector. In Sections 5 and 6 we bring the results from a plethora of estimations of different econometric 
models that try to measure the effects of private provision on access and affordability. Section 7 offers a 
discussion of the econometric results and the last section concludes. 
 
2. Private provision of water services in Brazil 
 
2.1. Latest developments in the water sector 
The Planasa system mentioned in the introduction was dismantled by the Brazilian Constitution of 
1988, conspicuously pro-decentralization, and was subsequently abandoned. After its collapse, no 
consistent set of policies for the water and sanitation sector was put in place to fill the void, a situation 
that has persisted until recently. A law regulating the management of water resources in Brazil was 
passed by Congress (Law 9.433, January 8, 1997), but attempts to pass legislation specific to the water 
and sanitation sector have faced many hurdles, mainly because of disputes between municipalities and 
states over the right to grant concessions. 
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The Constitution established that public services such as water and sanitation should be provided 
by the State either directly or through concessions, and also authorized municipalities to grant 
concessions. The Constitution and the “Concessions Law” of 1995 (Law 8.987), however, are ambiguous 
when it comes to establishing which level of government is responsible for the provision of water and 
sanitation services and who has the power to grant concessions. The Constitution gave the municipalities 
the right to grant concessions of public services of local interest, but recognized that the federal and state 
governments should guarantee efficient and adequate regulation of water and sanitation services. These 
two provisions caused confusion as to how water and sanitation services in municipal and metropolitan 
areas, in most cases part of the concession areas of regional companies, should be regulated. 
The “Concessions Law” also determined that the municipalities should have the power to grant 
concessions or provide the services themselves. However, it kept the door open for the regional 
companies (CESB’s) to play a role by specifying that the municipalities could only renew concession 
contracts through public tenders, in which the regional companies could participate. 
In an attempt to restructure the sector, in 2001 the government submitted a project of law to 
Congress, known as PL 4.147, which gave sanitation companies administrative and financial autonomy, 
established pricing principles and concession criteria. Moreover, it established the state as the authority 
with the power to grant concessions in metropolitan areas, instead of the municipalities. The idea was to 
assure the financial viability of the state sanitation companies by allowing them to keep, at least in part, 
their ability to reap scale economies. These gains should be available to finance cross subsidies to poor 
municipalities within the area covered by the firm. 
The pricing principles introduced by the bill were based on incentive regulation, more specifically 
on price cap and yardstick competition methods. The main objective was to promote efficiency and 
participation of private capital. The weak flank of the bill was its inability to set a governance structure 
for the sanitation sector, shying away from a proposal to create a regulatory agency. 
The bill ran into the opposition of many stakeholders. The municipalities were against it mainly 
due to its provision that states were to have the power to grant concessions in metropolitan areas. There 
was also resistance to the project coming from segments reluctant to accept its directives regarding 
privatization, universal service and other issues. In particular, some questioned the participation of the 
private sector in sanitation, arguing that its profit-seeking motive was inconsistent with the provision of 
such essential services like water and sewage. 
One of the major concerns of the government of President Lula da Silva, which came to power in 
January of 2003, was to restructure and restore investments in the sanitation sector. The federal 
administration set up a task force within the Ministry of Cities to elaborate a draft bill to be submitted to 
Congress with the new regulatory framework for the sector. In a nutshell, the proposal suggested that the 
concession power should be assigned to municipalities when the service was of local interest and that 
pricing as well as concession procedures should be regulated by autonomous authorities. It should come 
as no surprise that this proposal ran into the same kind of difficulties as the one submitted by the previous 
administration, opposing those who support municipalities’ powers against those who want to preserve 
the cross subsidy system operated by state sanitation companies (Seroa da Motta and Moreira 2004). 
After a long period of discussions and some modifications, the bill was approved by Congress and 
sanctioned by President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva on January 5, 2007. It establishes criteria for 
municipalities and states to access federal financing and determines the constitution of councils with the 
participation of the civil society. These councils have leverage to influence municipalities’ decisions 
regarding tariff setting and termination of service due to lack of payment. The bill does not clearly define 
powers of concession, a matter that apparently will have to be decided by the country’s highest court. It 
does, however, establish that investments made by concessionaires will have to be reimbursed in case 
their contracts are unilaterally terminated by the municipalities. 
It stands to reason that the new bill will change the face of the Brazilian water and sanitation 
sector, which still reflects the guidelines set by Planasa in 1971. 
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2.2. Private sector participation in the water sector in Brazil 
In the North region of Brazil, Manaus, the capital of the state of Amazonas, and Novo Progresso, 
in the state of Pará, are the only cities where water is supplied by private companies. In the Midwest, 
there are private enterprises in the states of Mato Grosso, Mato Grosso do Sul and Tocantins. The 
Southeast concentrates most of the private experiences, mainly in the states of São Paulo and Rio de 
Janeiro, but also in Espírito Santo and Minas Gerais. In the South, the states of Paraná and Santa Catarina 
have tried private provision of sanitation services. 
There is considerable diversity in private enterprises undertaken so far in terms of financing and 
tariff structures. In some cases, companies subscribed the totality of their initial capital, while in others 
relatively sophisticated financing schemes including equity and debt were set up. However, many loans 
pledged to the new concessionaires by private and public institutions did not materialize (Parlatore 2000). 
Tariff structures are in line with those adopted in the past by the sector, based on minimum consumption 
rates, increasing block-rate tariffs, and differentiated according to user groups. In some cases, price cap 
regulation was implemented. 
Concessions are the contractual instrument of choice in most cases. The municipalities in the state 
of Rio de Janeiro that privatized their sanitation services have opted mostly for full concessions 
(including water and sewage), whereas those in the state of São Paulo have preferred partial concessions 
and, in some cases, permissions. 
The private groups that acquired the concessions were typically comprised of construction 
companies in the public works business lured into the sanitation market by the possibility of restoring 
their core business (shaken by the decline in public investments) through their concessions. There were a 
few cases of concessions granted to consortia of domestic and international companies where the 
domestic partner was usually a contractor and the international partner was a company with experience in 
the sanitation business (Parlatore 2000). 
 
3. Social policy and regulation 
Public policy in the water sector, be it regulatory or social, was until the late 1980’s centralized by 
the federal government in the National Housing Bank (BNH), which managed the FGTS,1 a sort of 
retirement trust fund whose resources could be used to finance projects in the sanitation sector, among 
other uses. As mentioned before, under the Planasa system those resources were used to entice 
municipalities into turning the provision of water and sewage services over to the CESBs, the regional 
(provincial) sanitation companies, which would then receive loans at interest rates lower than market 
rates. For an extended period of time, social policy for the sector amounted to heavy investments in the 
expansion of water supply systems (sewage was not a priority), thereby increasing coverage, and a 
system of cross subsidies put in place by the CESBs. According to that system, the same tariff was 
applied to all the different localities served by the company, irrespective of the cost of service. As a 
consequence, users in municipalities where the cost of service was smaller than the tariff subsidized those 
where the tariff was not high enough to cover the cost. 
The Planasa system of cross-subsidies, low interest loans, (almost) unlimited resources and heavy 
investments, resulted in an impressive expansion of coverage of water services. The expansion was 
uneven, though. Municipalities that didn’t sign up for Planasa, commissioning their water and sewage 
services to municipal companies or autonomous entities, in general did not fare as well as those that did. 
Moreover, low-income families were by and large excluded from the system, since projects financed by 
Planasa were in general required to yield a reasonable rate of return. 
With the end of BNH and Planasa, the scheme put in place over the years to monitor projects 
financed by the plan was dismantled. Some cross-subsidies remained, but now lacking transparency and 
control. As a consequence, companies became less efficient and different parties started to claim rights 
over the surplus generated by subsidies in places where revenue was higher than cost. No coherent policy 
for the sanitation sector replaced the Planasa system. Different ministries and federal government 
departments were put in charge of designing one, to no avail. There are many initiatives aimed at 
                                          
1 In Portuguese, Fundo de Garantia por Tempo de Serviço. 
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increasing investments in low income population areas and improving services in sanitation. 
Nevertheless, there is no integrated planning for the sanitation sector, with different ministries, like the 
Ministries of Cities, Health, Environment and National Integration, besides Tourism, Defense and 
Agriculture, being in charge of programs that finance projects in the sanitation sector. One can claim that 
this decentralization ends up lowering the quality of the projects implemented and the efficiency of public 
expenditure. Some of the most important programs put in place are the following: Pro-Sanitation, Pro-
Sanitize, Pro-Community, FCP/SAN, Rural Sanitation Program, Sanitation is Life, and Sanitation for 
Everyone.2 
In 2005, the federal government pledged R$700 millions to finance public sanitation projects, and 
R$640 millions to private company projects. From the federal budget, another R$800 millions in grants to 
state and municipal governments were laid out through individual and party parliamentary bills. 
Social policy has been mainly based on loans (investments) to expand and improve quality of 
water and sanitation services, some of them designed exclusively for low income families. Thus, the main 
concern is to improve access, affordability being given a much lower priority. Policies that target 
affordability issues are essentially those based on cross subsidies, which allow companies to charge 
“social tariffs” to low-income families. These are usually expressed in terms of a certain percentage of 
the full tariff. 
Virtually all sanitation companies, public and private, adopt social tariffs. There are exceptions 
like Prolagos, a private company that provides sanitation services to some municipalities in the state of 
Rio de Janeiro. Even though it does not have a social tariff, it uses an increasing block tariff scheme 
intended not only to favor low income families but also to rationalize the use of water. In the case of state 
regional companies, their tariff structures generally have to abide by rules specified in state and/or 
municipal laws, but there are many cases in which they have a lot of leeway to set tariffs. 
There is widespread use of increasing block tariffs. For example, most residential tariffs follow an 
increasing block scheme, with higher prices per cubic meter for higher consumption rates. Some 
companies charge a flat rate up to a certain consumption level, usually around 10 cubic meters. There are 
exceptions, though, like SANEPAR, the state company in charge of sanitation services in the state of 
Paraná. It currently adopts a two-part tariff, with a fixed rate (independent of consumption level) and a 
per cubic meter charge. 
Some private companies, like Citágua, in Cachoeiro de Itapemirim, state of Espírito Santo, 
actively engage in tariff policies designed for low income families, usually in cooperation with the 
municipalities. Citágua has a joint program with the city of Cachoeiro de Itapemirim that gives waivers to 
low income families with up to 10 cubic meters of consumption. Families have to register with the 
municipal department of social works in order to be eligible. 
 
4. Access to and affordability of water services in Brazil 
In this section, we provide a depiction of the evolution and current situation of the water sector in 
Brazil. Access to water as well as sewage services increased significantly in Brazil from 1970 to 2000, as 
can be seen in Figure 1. This has been possible as the result of heavy investment by the government. In 
spite of the strong expansion, water coverage rates in rural areas are still very low. The percentage of 
households with connection to water supply was 76% in 2000, with 90% coverage in urban areas and 
only 18% in rural areas3. Indicators of access to sewage services (including system connections and 
septic tanks) are even worse: 59.9% access overall, with 72% for urban and 13% for the rural 
population.4 
 
                                          
2 Information on these programs can be found at the Brazilian Ministry of Cities site, www.cidades.gov.br. 
3 These are all national figures. 
4 Since our main concern in this paper is with water services, sewage numbers are only mentioned here in this broad picture of 
the evolution of access to sanitation services in Brazil. 
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Figure 1  Access to water and sewage services (national averages) – Percentage of Households, 1970, 
1980, 1991, 2000 
 
Source: IBGE – 1970, 1980, 1991 and 2000 demographic censuses. 
 
Figure 2 presents annual data on access to water services only from 1997 to 2003. We notice a 
steady increase in access rates, which seem to be leveling off. 
 
Figure 2  Access to water services (national averages) – Percentage of Households, 1996-2003 
 
Source: IBGE – PNADs 1997-1999 and 2001-2003, Demographic Census 2000. 
 
Access to public services in Brazil is very unevenly distributed. Water supply is no exception. The 
following table shows the evolution of access to water services by income deciles for the period 1995-
2003. 
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Table 1  Access to water supply by deciles 1995-2003 
 
 
Note: Access to water supply is defined as percentage of households with piped water in at least one room of the house. 
Source: IBGE – PNADs 1995-1999 and 2001-2003, Demographic Census 2000 
 
Despite the significant increase in coverage for the lowest deciles, the gap between them and the 
highest deciles is still very large. In 2003, for instance, the access rate for households in the top 10% 
income bracket was 31.35% points above that for households in the bottom 10%. Not only is the 
distribution of access to water by income groups uneven, but also the distributions by region and location 
(urban or rural). The table below gives us a better idea of how skewed those distributions are: 
 
Table 2  Access to water supply by region and location 2001-2004 
 
 
Source: IBGE – PNADs 2001-2004 
 
Coverage rates in rural areas are significantly lower than in urban areas in all geographic regions, 
but remarkably so in the North and Northeast, where overall coverage rates are well below those in the 
Midwest, Southeast and South regions. The North and Northeast regions of Brazil are much less 
developed than the other regions, and low water supply access rates only reinforce that. 
It is also worth drawing a profile of households and individuals with and without access to piped 
water. It helps determine who should be targeted by social policies. Based on a descriptive analysis of our 
data, we obtained the following profile5: 
• In terms of regional location, approximately a third of households with access to piped 
water supply are in the rich Southeast region. In addition, around one half of the 
population without access to water is in poor Northeast region. (This is likely linked to the 
                                          
5 The results presented here can be found in a monograph by Marcelo Quintão entitled  “Setor de Saneamento Básico no 
Brasil: Características do Setor, Perfil de Acesso do Usuário e Participação da Iniciativa Privada.” The monograph was written 
under the supervision of this paper’s author. 
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fact that Planasa’s emphasis was on projects that could generate reasonable rates of return, 
mostly implemented in industrialized and developed regions.) 
• Families with access that do not own their homes live mostly in rented dwellings. On the 
other hand, families without access who are not owners usually live in properties made 
available by their employers or others. (This fact reinforces a characteristic of households 
excluded from the water system: a great deal of them live in rural areas, where it is 
customary for employers to provide lodging to their employees.) 
• Approximately 51% of households without access are in rural, isolated urban or non-
urbanized areas. 
• Most of the individuals without access to water service are between 0 and 10 years of age. 
This is a particularly troublesome statistic, for diseases caused by the consumption of non-
treated water affect mostly children less than five years old. 
• Illiteracy rate among individuals without access is very high when compared to those with 
access, approximately 10 percentage points higher. 
• Individuals without access have significantly less years of study than those with access. A 
striking 31% of those without access have less than one year of study, and more than 23% 
have only between 1 and 3 years of study. 
 
The characteristics associated with households and individuals without access are consistent with 
those usually found in low income families. This suggests that an increase in coverage of water services 
should benefit primarily poorer families. 
Affordability of water services in Brazil is also a critical issue. We can observe that by looking at 
the percentage of household income spent on water and sewage payments. The figure below shows the 
average percentage of household income spent on water and sewage bills by income groups, where these 
groups are defined in terms of multiples of the minimum salary on January 15, 2003.6 
 
Figure 3  Affordability by income groups 
 
 
Source: IBGE – 2002-2003 Survey of Household Budgets (POF) 
 
The graph above is striking evidence of how water and sewage bills are much more burdensome 
for low-income families than high-income families. For instance, whereas families with incomes no 
greater than two minimum salaries (MS) spend 1.46% of their monthly budget on water and sewage 
payments, families in the top tier, those who earn more than 30 MS, only spend 0.29 percent of their 
monthly budget on those services. 
                                          
6 The minimum salary was R$200 (two hundred Reais) then, approximately US$58 at the average exchange rate at the time, 
and approximately US$88 at the exchange rate in November of 2005. 
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5. Impact of private provision on access to water service 
The depiction in the previous section of access to water supply in Brazil entails an investigation of 
whether or not private provision of water services has had any impact on access rates in Brazil. In order 
to evaluate quantitatively the impact of private provision on access, we use two separate datasets to try 
and estimate the effect of private provision on access to water supply. The first is the National Sanitation 
Information System (SNIS), published by the Program for the Modernization of the Sanitation Sector 
(PMSS) of the Brazilian Ministry of Cities. The second is the Brazil Human Development Atlas (HAD), 
a publication of the United Nations Development Programme in Brazil. The two sets of regressions will 
be presented separately. 
 
5.1. Estimations using the SNIS dataset 
The SNIS database includes information on close to 170 indicators related to water and sewage 
services over the period 1995-2003 for a large number of municipalities. In 2003, for instance, 2058 
municipalities were included in the database. Since the sample may vary from one year to another, due 
mainly to changes in the set of service providers at the local level and to the fact that participation in the 
survey is not mandatory, it is not a true panel. However, by using a smaller sample, where the 
municipalities are the same for the entire period of time considered, we were able to obtain an 
(unbalanced) panel of 1548 municipalities in Brazil from 2001 to 2003. The panel contains information 
on 41 variables, including economic, operational and quality indicators. 
We are interested in estimating the relationship between access to water services and the type of 
company that provides such services, whether private or public. Our model will be of the form 
 0 1 1
1
, 1, , , 1, ,
K
it it k itk i it
k
ACCESS DPRIV x a u i N t Tα α α +
=
= + + + + = =∑ … …  
where the itkx ’s are the observations of the K other explanatory variables besides DPRIV, ia  is the 
unobserved effect (also called fixed effect) and itu  is the idiosyncratic error. The dependent variable is 
ACCESS, defined as population with access to water service over population of the municipality. DPRIV 
is a dummy variable that takes value one if water service is provided by a company under private 
management and zero otherwise. We postulate that the company’s decision regarding how much service 
coverage to provide depends on whether it is privately or publicly managed. A private company seeks 
maximum profits whereas a public company might be pursuing social goals, and that might result in 
different decisions. 
The unobserved effect ia  does not vary with time but varies with municipality (our cross-section 
unit), and as such captures all time-invariant (at least during the sample span) unobserved factors that 
affect the dependent variable itACCESS . For instance, factors such as the political party running the 
administration, geographical and demographical characteristics, which are specific to each municipality, 
are included in ia . It can also be thought of as capturing historical aspects particular to each municipality, 
like the pre-sample average access rate, the preferences of the population regarding public versus private 
provision of public services etc. 
When this model (the other explanatory variables will be made explicit below) is estimated by 
first-differences, fixed effects and random effects, the results vary substantially with the estimation 
method. That the two first methods produce very different results is surprising, since we know that both 
the first-difference and the fixed effects estimators are unbiased and consistent, under appropriate 
assumptions. The main reason behind the different estimates is the fact that the dependent variable is 
binary and doesn’t change much over time, i.e., there are not many instances when municipalities switch 
from private to public provision or vice-versa. Since the first-difference estimator is the result of a pooled 
regression of the variables in (time) difference, the explanatory variable can assume only three possible 
values, 0, 1 and -1. This lack of variation can be held responsible for the non-significance of the variable 
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DPRIV obtained with first-difference estimation. When the fixed effect estimator is used, however, 
DPRIV becomes significant. That can be attributed to the fact that there is more variation in the 
explanatory variable.7 
When the random effects estimator is used, the results differ considerably from those obtained 
with the other two methods. That can also be explained by the presence of the binary explanatory variable 
DPRIV, better handled by the random effects method.8 On the other hand, the random effects method is 
valid only under the assumption that the unobserved effects are not correlated with the explanatory 
variable. In many applications, including ours, the point of using panel data is exactly to allow for the 
existence of such correlation. 
Let’s now specify the other explanatory variables in the model. Since T is small compared to N in 
our sample, it is a good idea to add time dummies to take into account secular changes that have not been 
modelled. We use time dummies for the years 2002 and 2003, named D02 and D03, respectively. 
The cost of providing water services is certainly an important factor to be included in the model. 
We use as proxy to cost variables the variables DENSITY, EXCONNECT, NUMCONNECT, 
PRODUCTIVITY and INVEST. DENSITY is defined as number of water economies9 by connection, and 
tries to measure possible economies of density. EXCONNECT is the extension of the water system by 
water connection. It tries to capture geographic effects, for its value depends on the topography of the 
terrain where the municipality is located. NUMCONNECT is the number of water connections and 
accounts for possible (economies of) scale effects. A large number of water connections is allegedly 
associated with big economies of scale, and that, in turn, should produce higher access rates. 
The variable PRODUCTIVITY is defined as the number of employees over thousand water 
connections and therefore is something under management control. INVEST is the company’s investment 
in the water supply system, measured in Reais (the Brazilian currency). The last explanatory variable is 
GDPPERCAP, the municipality’s per capita GDP. It is a proxy for the average income of the 
municipality’s population, and as such is included to take account of revenue prospects for the water 
service provider. 
The equation to be estimated is thus: 
 
0 1 2 3 4
5 6 7
8 9
02 03
1, , , 1, ,
it it t t it
it
it i it
ACCESS DPRIV D D DENSITY
EXCONNECT NUMCONNECT INVEST
PRODUCTIVITY GDPPERCAP a u
i N t T
α α α α α
α α α
α α
= + + + +
+ + +
+ + + +
= =… …
 (1) 
This equation can be looked at as one describing the factors that affect the water company’s 
decision regarding how much access to provide. It is possible, however, that ACCESS and DPRIV are 
simultaneously determined, which would render DPRIV endogenous. If that is the case, it is necessary to 
formulate a simultaneous equations model. The second equation could be the following: 
 
0 1 2 3 4
5
02 03
1, , , 1, ,
it it t t
i it
DPRIV ACCESS D D FLUOR
LOSSES b v
i N t T
β β β β β
β
= + + + +
+ + +
= =… …
 (2) 
                                          
7 Recall that the fixed effects estimator is the result of a pooled regression of the (time) reduced model, where the levels of the 
variables are replaced by their differences to the time average, i.e., itx  is replaced by it ix x− . The time averages depend on 
the sequence of ones and zeros assumed by the variable DPRIV for each unit (municipality), which means that there is more 
variation in iitDPRIV DPRIV−  than in DPRIVΔ . 
8 In fact, since the random effects estimator is the pooled OLS estimator of an equation of type 
( ) ( ) ( )0
1
1 ,
k
it i j itj ij it i
j
y y x x v vλ β λ β λ λ
=
− = − + − + −∑  where ( ) 1 22 2 21 u u aTλ σ σ σ⎡ ⎤= − +⎣ ⎦ , it can handle explanatory 
variables with limited variation (and no variation at all) much better than the other two methods. 
9 An economy is defined as a dwelling, apartment, office, shop, industry or similar unit within a building with access to water 
supply. 
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The municipality is the decision maker in this second equation. We posit that the municipality’s 
decision whether or not to privatise depends on FLUOR and LOSSES besides ACCESS. The idea is that 
the lower the quality of service and the higher the losses in distribution, the higher the propensity of the 
municipality to try privatisation as a solution. 
We only estimated this simultaneous equation model for cross-sections, though. It was not 
possible to do it with our longitudinal data set because of the lack of temporal variation of DPRIV. The 
instrumental variables approach used to estimate simultaneous equations requires DPRIV to be 
instrumented by the exogenous variables in the model, i.e., that an intermediary regression of DPRIV on 
those variables be run. But this intermediary regression cannot be run by any of the panel data methods 
because of the aforementioned lack of variation of DPRIV. 
The first equation is the one we want to estimate. It is easy to see that it is identified. The order 
condition says that the second equation must contain at least one exogenous variable excluded from the 
first equation. That is true in our model, since FLUOR and LOSSES are not included in the first equation. 
The order condition is only necessary, though. The sufficient condition is that either FLUOR or LOSSES 
has a significant coefficient in the estimated reduced form of DPRIV, which is also satisfied. 
The results of the estimation of the simultaneous equation model (1)-(2) for three cross-sections, 
corresponding to the years 2001, 2002 and 2003, are in Table 3 below. We actually used the logarithm of 
access to the water system as the dependent variable (LACCESS), for it provides a handy interpretation of 
the coefficients, an approach we maintained in the other regressions. 
 
Table 3  Cross-section estimation of impact of private provision on access to water 
Explanatory 
variables 
Cross-section year 
2001 
Cross-section year 
2002 
Cross-section year 
2003 
DPRIV -0.6072625 (0.327) 
-17.07954 
(0.384) 
2.810708 
(0.000) 
D02 Dropped due to collinearity 
Dropped due to 
collinearity 
Dropped due to 
collinearity 
D03 Dropped due to collinearity 
Dropped due to 
collinearity 
Dropped due to 
collinearity 
DENSITY 0.3670115 (0.169) 
3.736651 
(0.363) 
-0.0023606 
(0.992) 
EXCONNECT -0.0011727 (0.800) 
-0.0009388 
(0.856) 
-0.0123589 
(0.001) 
NUMCONNECT -2.72e-08 (0.986) 
-3.72e-06 
(0.602) 
2.94e-06 
(0.000) 
INVEST 1.26e-08 (0.727) 
8.15e-08 
(0.448) 
-4.38e-08 
(0.026) 
PRODUCTIVITY -0.019149 (0.262) 
-0.06492 
(0.060) 
-.0077489 
(0.342) 
GDPPERCAP 4.27e-06 (0.444) 
0.0000309 
(0.233) 
7.96e-06 
(0.019) 
CONSTANT 4.157417 (0.000) 
0.4200661 
(0.920) 
4.018481 
(0.000) 
Prob F>  0.1114 0.2527 0.0000 
Number of 
observations 103 964 1062 
Note: Each column reports the estimated coefficients of the regression of the dependent variable 
LACCESS on the explanatory variables. P-values are in parentheses. The estimation method was two-
stage least squares and the instruments used were D02, DO3, DENSITY, EXCONNECT, 
NUMCONNECT, INVEST, PRODUCTIVITY, GDPPERCAP, FLUOR and LOSSES. 
 
The regressions using the 2001 and 2002 cross-sections are not good fits. All the explanatory 
variables are non-significant, with the exception of PRODUCTIVITY in the 2002 regression. The 
coefficients are jointly non-significant in both regressions. The 2003 cross-section produced better 
results. Most of the explanatory variables (all but DENSITY and PRODUCTIVITY) are significant at the 
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5% level and have the right coefficients. The exception is INVEST, whose coefficient is negative. One 
would expect higher investment to lead to higher access. The coefficient of DPRIV, however, although 
positive and significant, is unrealistic. If correct, it would mean that private provision of water service, all 
the rest the same, increases access by 281%. That clearly doesn’t make sense. 
We conclude then that the cross-section estimations have to be abandoned in favour of panel data 
regressions. The existence of time-invariant unobserved effects is likely making the OLS estimators 
inconsistent and biased. 
When fixed effects or first difference methods are used, time-constant explanatory variables are 
not identified, as mentioned before. Also, in cases where the key explanatory variables do not vary much 
over time, FE and FD methods can lead to imprecise estimates, and that seems to be the case with our 
estimations. Thus, when we are primarily interested in the effect of a time-constant or almost time-
constant variable in a panel data study, the robustness of the FE estimator to correlation between the 
unobserved effect and the explanatory variables is practically useless. Without using an instrumental 
variables approach, we may then be forced to use random effects estimation in order to learn anything 
about the population parameters. 
But in cases where the explanatory variable of primary interest is time-invariant and the 
unobserved effect is correlated with some explanatory variables, random effects will produce inconsistent 
estimators of all parameters.10 A possible (partial) solution is to add dummy variables for various groups 
to control for the part of the unobserved effect correlated with the explanatory variables, assuming there 
are many observations within each group. Another solution is to follow and IV approach known as the 
Hausman-Taylor (Hausman and Taylor 1981)11 method. This method fits random effects models in which 
some of the explanatory variables are correlated with the unobserved individual-level random effects by 
using instrumental variables and applying a generalized least squares transformation. 
We run the two types of regression. To apply the random effects with additional dummy variables 
approach, we add 4 location dummy variables to equation (1): DUMNORTH, DUMMW, DUMNE, 
DUMSE and DUMSOUTH. They take value 1 when the municipality is located in the north, midwest, 
northeast, southeast and south regions of Brazil, respectively. One of them is dropped to avoid 
collinearity. 
In order to apply the Hausman-Taylor approach, we need extra time-invariant exogenous 
variables to use as instruments. We chose to create dummy variables for population size and add them to 
the model. They are DUMPOP1, DUMPOP2, DUMPOP3 and DUMPOP4, and they take value 1 when 
the population is less than or equal to 50,000, between 50,000 and 100,000, between 100,000 and 
500,000, and more than 500,000 inhabitants, respectively. One of them is dropped to avoid collinearity. 
For each approach, we estimate two types of model. The parsimonious model is just equation (1) 
with the additional dummy variables. The full model includes dummy variables to take account of the 
effects of private provision by GDP per capita deciles. There are dummy variables for each GDP per 
capita deciles, called 1DGP  to 10DGDP , and interaction dummy variables defined as: 
 * , 1, ,10k kDPRIVGDP DPRIV DGDP k= = … . 
 
We first discuss the results of the parsimonious model, presented below: 
 
                                          
10 We did a Hausman test which detected correlation between the explanatory variables and the unobserved effect. 
11 Hausman, J.A. and W.E. Taylor (1981), “Panel Data and Unobservable Individual Effects,” Econometrica 49, 1377-1398. 
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Table 4  Estimation of parsimonious model of impact of private provision on access to water by random 
effects and Hausman-Taylor 
Explanatory variables Random effects Hausman-Taylor 
DPRIV 0.2665208 (0.000) 
0.4136876 
(0.001) 
DUMNORTH -0.562246 (0.000) -- 
DUMNW -0.4436507 (0.000) -- 
DUMSW -0.0496323 (0.265) -- 
DUMSOUTH -0.1789914 (0.000) -- 
DUMPOP1 -- 0.5605235 (0.000) 
DUMPOP2 -- 0.722 (0.000) 
DUMPOP3 -- 0.7912657 (0.000) 
D02 -0.0241538 (0.162) 
-0.0155124 
(0.343) 
D03 -0.0167523 (0.336) 
-0.0045262 
(0.784) 
DENSITY 0.2249518 (0.001) 
0.7292422 
(0.000) 
EXCONNECT -0.0029879 (0.000) 
-0.0019325 
(0.034) 
NUMCONNECT 7.83e-07 (0.000) 
1.12e-06 
(0.000) 
INVEST -2.48e-09 (0.417)
-2.18e-09 
(0.461)
PRODUCTIVITY -0.0122015 (0.000) 
-0.011467 
(0.000) 
GDPPERCAP 1.65e-06 (0.112) 
3.50e-06 
(0.001) 
CONSTANT 4.135724 (0.000)
2.658026 
(0.000)
2Prob χ>  0.000 0.000 
2R  (overall) 0.2550  
Number of observations 3232 3232 
Note: Each column reports the estimated coefficients of the regression of the 
dependent variable LACCESS on the explanatory variables. P-values are in 
parentheses. 
 
The two methods produce very similar qualitative results. All the continuous explanatory 
variables with the exception of INVEST (and GDPPERCAP in the random effects estimation) are 
significant and their coefficients have the same sign across the two estimations. The time dummies are 
not significant in any of the estimations, but the location dummies in the random effects model are (with 
the exception of DUMSW), as well as the population size dummies in the Hausman-Taylor model. That is 
evidence that our choice of dummy variables was appropriate. 
Although our main interest falls on the dummy variable DPRIV, let’s comment briefly on the 
signs of the other explanatory variables. DENSITY has a positive coefficient, as expected, indicating that 
economies of density tend to increase access to water service. EXCONNECT and NUMCONNECT have 
negative and positive coefficients, respectively. That is also in accordance with expectations. Higher 
values of the extension of the water system by water connection usually reflect higher costs to provide 
access, whereas larger numbers of water connections are associated with economies of scale. The 
negative sign of the variable PRODUCTIVITY indicates that more efficient companies are associated with 
larger access rates. Finally, GDPPERCAP has a positive impact on access rates, meaning that richer 
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municipalities are likely to have higher water service coverage. These two last effects are also in line with 
expectations. 
The most important effect measured by the estimations above is that of private provision on 
access to water service, as measured by the coefficient of the dummy variable DPRIV. According to the 
estimation of the first model, private provision increases the access rate by approximately 26.7% when 
the other explanatory variables are held constant. That impact increases to approximately 41.4% when the 
Hausman-Taylor approach is used. That is a very strong effect. Even if the absolute values of the 
coefficients seem to be excessive, the important result is that there is strong evidence that private 
provision increases access to water service in Brazil. 
The next question is whether this impact differs by income decile. Since we don’t have 
information on income by municipality, we use GDP per capita deciles instead. The results of the full 
model, presented below, help us answer that question. 
 
Table 5  Estimation of full model of impact of private provision on access to water by random effects and 
Hausman-Taylor 
 
Explanatory variables Random effects Hausman-Taylor 
DPRIV 0.6445816 (0.000) 
0.1342431 
(0.404) 
DUMNORTH -0.5281106 (0.000) -- 
DUMNW -0.2547579 (0.000) -- 
DUMSW -0.0451631 (0.295) -- 
DUMSOUTH -0.1930323 (0.000) -- 
DUMPOP1 -- 0.3147722 (0.030) 
DUMPOP2 -- 0.4474297 (0.002) 
DUMPOP3 -- 0.5305866 (0.000) 
D02 -0.0346598 (0.047) 
-0.024471 
(0.129) 
D03 -0.0404152 (0.023) 
-0.033174 
(0.044) 
2DGDP  
0.0597187 
(0.042) 
0.0455404 
(0.118) 
3DGDP  
0.1785324 
(0.000) 
0.1611969 
(0.000) 
4DGDP  
0.24563 
(0.000) 
0.2454423 
(0.000) 
5DGDP  
0.3234062 
(0.000) 
0.3474403 
(0.000) 
6DGDP  
0.3442111 
(0.000) 
0.3856703 
(0.000) 
7DGDP  
0.3796232 
(0.000) 
0.428812 
(0.000) 
8DGDP  
0.4087276 
(0.000) 
0.4593574 
(0.000) 
9DGDP  
0.44661 
(0.000) 
0.5037341 
(0.000) 
10DGDP  
0.4963495 
(0.000) 
0.5526444 
(0.000) 
2DPRIVGDP  
-0.0473192 
(0.654) 
0.1787632 
(0.224) 
3DPRIVGDP  
-0.1067318 
(0.340) 
0.1810843 
(0.270) 
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4DPRIVGDP  
-0.251691 
(0.027) 
0.0844862 
(0.615) 
5DPRIVGDP  
-0.3612749 
(0.002) 
0.0234328 
(0.891) 
6DPRIVGDP  
-0.4779364 
(0.000) 
-0.0849826 
(0.619) 
7DPRIVGDP  
-0.49469 
(0.000)
-0.0820913 
(0.629)
8DPRIVGDP  
-0.4760866 
(0.000) 
-0.0638001 
(0.709) 
9DPRIVGDP  
-0.4900681 
(0.000) 
-0.0815515 
(0.637) 
10DPRIVGDP  
-0.5416796 
(0.000) 
-0.1103929 
(0.541) 
DENSITY 0.1890071 (0.004) 
0.4186046 
(0.000) 
EXCONNECT -0.0030651 (0.000) 
-0.0020704 
(0.020) 
NUMCONNECT 6.49e-07 (0.000) 
8.02e-07 
(0.000) 
INVEST -1.89e-09 (0.537) 
-1.47e-09 
(0.611) 
PRODUCTIVITY -0.0124824 (0.000) 
-0.011942 
(0.000) 
GDPPERCAP -3.13e-06 (0.015) 
-3.23e-06 
(0.009) 
CONSTANT 3.867543 (0.000) 
3.034657 
(0.000) 
2Prob χ>  0.000 0.000 
2R  (overall) 0.3120  
Number of observations 3232 3232 
Note: Each column reports the estimated coefficients of the regression of the 
dependent variable LACCESS on the explanatory variables. P-values are in 
parentheses. 
 
The coefficients of the continuous explanatory variables keep the same signs as in the previous 
estimations, so we will not comment on them. The only exception is GDPPERCAP, whose coefficient 
has become negative and very close to zero. That is the result of the inclusion of the GDP per capita 
decile dummies, which capture the same effects. 
In the random effects estimation, the coefficient of DPRIV is positive and significant. The impact 
of private provision on access rates is approximately 65%. That is even higher than the estimates we 
obtained before. In the Hausman-Taylor estimation, however, despite being positive, the coefficient of 
DPRIV is not significant12. 
In both estimations, the GDP decile dummy variables are significant (except 2DGDP  in the 
Hausman-Taylor model). Notice that the higher deciles display the largest coefficients, as expected. This 
means that municipalities in higher deciles have higher access rates. For instance, municipalities in the 
highest (tenth) decile have access rates approximately 44% (0.4963495 - 0.0597187) higher than those in 
the second decile. 
As for the interaction dummies, they are all non-significant in the Hausman-Taylor estimation. In 
the random effects estimation, the interaction dummies for the lower deciles are not significant, but those 
for the higher deciles (starting from the fourth decile) are. The table below lists the different impacts of 
private provision of water services according to GDP per capita decile. 
 
                                          
12 The coefficient is significant if ACCESS is used as the dependent variable instead of LACCESS. 
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Table 6  Impact of private provision of water service by GDP per capita decile 
Decile Percentage increase in ACCESS 
4th 39.29 
5th 28.33 
6th 16.66 
7th 14.99 
8th 16.85 
9th 15.45
10th 10.29 
 
The number in the table above should be read like this: municipalities with private provision of 
water service belonging to the 4th decile of GDP per capita, for instance, have, on average, access rates 
39.29% higher than those in the same decile but with public provision. Notice how the impact of private 
provision on access to water service is higher in the lower deciles, indicating that the benefits of higher 
access rates due to privatization accrue mostly to poorer municipalities. 
 
5.2. Estimation using the HAD dataset 
 
In the models estimated in the previous section, we made no attempt to account for a possible 
“inertia” effect, i.e., to reckon that access rates in one period are highly dependent on access rates in the 
previous period. Panel data models with lagged dependent variables should be estimated by conditional 
maximum likelihood, and several identification and computational issues have to be addressed. 
Moreover, the inclusion of the lagged ACCESS as an explanatory variable would likely blur the effects of 
the other explanatory variables. We chose instead to use a different dataset to compare the situation of 
municipalities in terms of access rates before and after the beginning of the privatizations of water 
supply. 
The database used in this new wave of regressions comes from the Brazil Human Development 
Atlas (HAD), a publication of the United Nations Development Programme in Brazil. This database 
consolidates data available in the 1991 and 2000 Brazilian Demographic Censuses published by IBGE. 
The objective of the second set of regressions is again to identify the average effect of private 
provision on access to water supply. Ideally, this would be done by comparing access rates when water 
services are privately provided to the counterfactual, namely access rates when services are publicly 
provided in the treatment (subject to private provision) areas at the same point in time. Of course, this 
counterfactual is not observed, and we need to resort to estimation methods. The first choice would be to 
conduct an experiment where private and public management are randomly assigned to municipalities 
and then compare the average outcomes of the two groups. Once again, that choice is not available to us, 
for the decision to privatize water services is hardly random. There is the possibility then that 
municipalities that choose to privatize are different along some dimensions from those that choose not to 
privatize and that these differences are correlated with access. 
This concern will always be present in our non-experimental estimations, but we will try and 
minimize it by controlling for time-invariant unobserved effects. This will be done by means of using a 
panel data and a difference-in-differences estimator. In that respect, we follow Galiani et al. (2005) and 
Fujiwara (2004), who use this method to assess the impact of privatization on infant mortality rates. 
The difference-in-differences method amounts to comparing the change in outcomes in the 
treatment group before and after the treatment (in our case, privatization) is applied to the change in 
outcomes in the control group (in our case, the set of municipalities which did not privatize their water 
services). By comparing changes, it is possible to isolate the effects of treatment from other factors 
affecting the outcome. 
As is well know (see, for instance, Wooldridge (2002)), the difference-in-differences estimator 
can be obtained by running a fixed effects panel data regression. We follow that procedure here. The 
dependent variable is again ACCESS, but this time defined as the percentage of the population living in 
households with access to piped water. The explanatory variables are DPRIV, defined as before, 
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INCPERCAP, the per capita income of the municipality, GINI, the Gini index, POVERTY, a poverty 
intensity index, and RURALPOPPERC, the percentage of the population of the municipality living in 
rural areas. The estimation results can be found in the table below13: 
 
Table 7  Estimation of impact of private provision on access to water using difference-in-differences 
approach 
 
Explanatory variables Fixed effects 
DPRIV 6.30713 (0.000) 
INCPERCAP 0.07417 (0.000) 
GINI 72.82137 (0.000) 
POVERTY -0.61558 (0.000) 
RURALPOPPERC -38.10226 (0.000) 
CONSTANT 57.21342 (0.000) 
Prob F>  0.000 
2R  (overall) 0.6256 
Number of observations 11,014 
Note: Each column reports the estimated coefficients of 
the regression of the dependent variable ACCESS on 
the explanatory variables. P-values are in parentheses. 
 
The model provides a good fit to the data, as confirmed by the significance of all the coefficients. 
The signs of the coefficients of the explanatory variables are consistent with our ex ante expectations. 
Higher access rates are associated with higher income per capita and lower poverty indices. The 
percentage of the population living in rural areas has a negative effect on access, indicating that 
municipalities with large rural populations should be targets for universal service policies. As for the 
effect of the Gini index of inequality on access, positive according to our estimations, one plausible 
explanation is that municipalities where there is more inequality are relatively large metropolitan areas 
where coverage is high due to the existence of economies of scale. 
But our main concern here is with the variable DPRIV, which measures the effect of private 
provision on access rates. Just as in our previous estimations, we get a positive and significant estimated 
coefficient, confirming the positive impact of privatization on access by the population to water services. 
Given the already relatively high coverage rates of the higher income deciles of the Brazilian population, 
it is fair to say that the benefits of such increased access rates due to private provision accrue mostly to 
lower income families. 
 
6. The effect of private provision on affordability of water services 
The analysis of section 4 prompted us to investigate the effects of private provision on access to 
water supply. As pointed out there, affordability of water services is also a major issue in Brazil. We turn 
now to the task of studying whether or not the participation of privately operated companies has had any 
impact on the affordability of water services. 
The basic model to determine how private provision affects the ability of consumers to pay their 
water bills is the following: 
                                          
13 The regression using ACCESS as dependent variable instead of LACCESS provided a better fit. 
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The variable AFFOR was constructed as the product of consumption per capita and tariff divided 
by GDP per capita, i.e., 
 CONPERCAP TARIFFAFFOR
GDPPERCAP
×= , 
where the variable CONPERCAP is defined as per capita water consumption, whereas TARIFF is the 
average tariff charged. 
This approach evidently has many shortcomings. The first is that the decision unit is the 
municipality instead of the household. Therefore, we are not measuring the impact of private provision by 
household income group, but rather by municipality income group. Another shortcoming is that the 
variable we constructed is only a proxy for average municipal income, and as such is an imperfect 
measure. Unfortunately, we did not have access to data at the household level where it would be possible 
to identify if the household was served by a private or a public company. 
The model is predicated on the idea that the tariff charged by water companies, who are 
monopolists in their concession areas, depends on demand and cost factors. That explains the inclusion of 
the cost variables DENSITY, EXCONNECT, NUMCONNECT, INVEST and PRODUCTIVITY. The 
variable FLUOR captures the quality of the service provided, and as such is included to reflect possible 
cost increases due to increased quality. As for the variable GDPPERCAP, it is an imperfect measure of 
the demand dimension. 
Contrary to what happened in the model for access, we do not expect any simultaneity between 
the variables AFFOR and DPRIV. It is not sensible to imagine, for instance, that municipalities decide 
whether or not to privatize depending on the ability of households to pay their water bills. 
The table below brings the results of the two types of model, parsimonious and full, estimated by 
random effects.14 
 
Table 8  Estimation of impact of private provision on affordability of water service: Parsimonious and 
full model , random effects and Hausman-Taylor 
 
Explanatory variables Random effects 
Parsimonious Full 
DPRIV -0.2172622 (0.000) 
-0.1264653 
(0.476) 
DUMNW 0.3599308 (0.000) 
-0.2871546 
(0.000) 
DUMSW 0.2710399 (0.000)
0.0455377 
(0.475)
DUMSOUTH 0.2672321 (0.000) 
0.1154084 
(0.078) 
DUMMW 0.0683185 (0.182) 
-0.1496533 
(0.029) 
D02 0.0210271 (0.687)
-0.0097488 
(0.837)
D03 -0.0153817 (0.769) 
0.0175842 
(0.711) 
2DGDP  -- 
-0.1895335 
(0.008) 
3DGDP  -- 
-0.4104072 
(0.000)
                                          
14 The Hausman-Taylor estimations were not satisfactory. Most explanatory variables came out non-significant. The 
coefficient of the dummy variable DPRIV, however, was negative and significant. 
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4DGDP  -- 
-0.6292522 
(0.000) 
5DGDP  -- 
-0.8001867 
(0.000) 
6DGDP  -- 
-0.9280072 
(0.000) 
7DGDP  -- 
-1.069333 
(0.000)
8DGDP  -- 
-1.262978 
(0.000) 
9DGDP  -- 
-1.402245 
(0.000) 
10DGDP  -- 
-1.56948 
(0.000) 
2DPRIVGDP  -- Dropped due to collinearity 
3DPRIVGDP  -- Dropped due to collinearity 
4DPRIVGDP  -- Dropped due to collinearity 
5DPRIVGDP  -- 
0.09059 
(0.701) 
6DPRIVGDP  -- 
-0.0476917 
(0.810) 
7DPRIVGDP  -- 
-0.1164308 
(0.548) 
8DPRIVGDP  -- 
-0.2367171 
(0.221) 
9DPRIVGDP  -- 
-0.196412 
(0.310) 
10DPRIVGDP  -- 
-0.1943224 
(0.334) 
DENSITY 0.3569335 (0.000) 
0.6033506 
(0.000) 
EXCONNECT -0.0019625 (0.016) 
-0.0019737 
(0.003) 
NUMCONNECT -1.38e-06 (0.000) 
-6.11e-07 
(0.026) 
INVEST 8.39e-10 (0.861) 
1.67e-09 
(0.689) 
PRODUCTIVITY 0.0076757 (0.004) 
0.0094054 
(0.000) 
FLUOR 0.0010848 (0.2777) 
-0.0000956 
(0.910) 
GDPPERCAP -0.0000481 (0.000) 
-0.0000314 
(0.000) 
CONSTANT -3.933787 (0.000) 
-3.160212 
(0.000) 
2Prob χ>  0.000 0.000 
2R  (overall) 0.5639 0.7298 
Number of observations 1393 1393
 
The continuous explanatory variables are all significant in both regressions, with the exception of 
INVEST and the quality variable FLUOR 
The density of economies per water connection has a positive effect on the average payment for 
water service as a share of GDP per capita, whereas the extension of the water system by water 
connection and the number of connections have positive effects. Productivity gains translate into lower 
water payments, as attested by the positive coefficient of the variable PRODUCTIVITY. And 
GDPPERCAP is negatively related to the share of water charges, as expected. 
All the interaction dummies in the full model are non-significant, and so we cannot make any 
inference about the effects of private provision by GDP per capita decile based on the signs or the values 
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of the coefficients. The coefficients of the GDP per capita decile dummies, on the other hand, are all 
significant and negative. Moreover, they increase in absolute value as the decile increases. This means 
that water is more affordable to inhabitants of municipalities in the higher deciles. 
Last, but not least, the coefficient of DPRIV is negative in both estimations, although not 
significant in the full model. The parsimonious model tells us that the ratio of water payments to per 
capita GDP in municipalities with private provision of water services is, ceteris paribus, 21.7% lower. 
This is evidence that private participation in water supply has beneficial effects for the population not 
only with respect to access, but also to affordability. 
 
7. Discussion of econometric results 
There is no evidence in the results we obtained to support the argument that private sector 
provision in the Brazilian water sector, still a very limited experience, has had an adverse impact on 
affordability or access. In fact, we obtained some evidence that there was an improvement in access 
which was more pronounced in municipalities at the bottom of the income (GDP) per capita spectrum. 
These results allow us to conjecture that low income households have benefited the most in that respect, 
since Brazil has a relatively high coverage rate in water provision (in comparison to other developing 
countries) and higher income families are usually the first to get access. We conjecture that part of this 
result can be attributed to investment obligations assumed by private operators at the time they were 
granted their concessions. Total scheduled investments by private operators until the end of their 
concession contracts (between 2025 and 2030) amounts to R$3.38 billions (approximately U$1.54 
billion), of which R$1.10 billion (approximately U$500 million) or 32,7% had been disbursed until the 
end of 2004. Disbursements until the end of 2009 are estimated at half the total value of investments. 
The table and figures below show that, despite displaying lower investments than publicly-owned 
or managed companies on average,15 privately-owned or managed companies beat their public 
counterparts in all size categories in that respect. 
 
Table 9  Investments by type and size of operator 
2001 2002 2003 2004
Direct public administration 136453.49 143025.42 103051.10 111429.17
Local 136453.49 143025.42 103051.10 111429.17
Microregional -- -- -- --
Regional -- -- -- --
Autarky 532386.30 557997.06 547126.94 457645.92
Local 513055.39 521468.55 548444.20 434981.40
Microregional 405257.85 602674.69 608623.33 541248.61
Regional 3454309.86 5785506.69 5174.13 4792124.56
Privately-owned company or 
public company with private 
management 8480585.47 9251176.07 9686443.71 5560120.69
Local 3041880.35 3725373.26 2876372.75 1516335.76
Microregional 4537491.10 4189316.61 4408820.93 3548444.67
Regional 50494615.71 52993655.18 65273374.62 69234408.74
Publicly-owned company or 
public company with public 
management 23075693.54 25684752.22 17500182.89 25234027.12
Local 1950978.61 1587030.93 2007809.76 2431744.95
Microregional -- -- -- --
Regional 30757408.07 35542910.92 25246369.46 37178079.69  
Source: PMSS – National Sanitation Information System (SNIS). 
                                          
15 This result is due to the fact that there are no microregional publicly-owned or managed companies, which props up their 
average 
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Note: Local operators are those that provide water services only to the municipality where they are located. 
Microregional operators are those which provide services to more that one municipality, normally in small number 
and adjacent to each other, including intermunicipal consortia. Regional providers are those that serve several 
municipalities, including the CESB’s (state companies). 
 
Figure 4  Investments by type and size of operator 
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When it comes to assessing the impact of private provision on affordability, our results are not so 
clear. We obtained some evidence that in municipalities with a private operator water services are 
relatively less expensive, as measured by the share of GDP per capita taken up by water payments. Our 
estimations resulted not significant, though, when we tried to assess the effect of private provision on 
affordability by income (GDP) per capita deciles. 
In summary, there is evidence that greater presence of private undertakings in the Brazilian water 
sector (and the sanitation sector in general) can be beneficial, not only because the sector has a great 
demand for investments which cannot come entirely from the public sector, but also because private 
provision can improve access to the poor without creating an excessive financial burden on them. 
This potential greater participation of the private sector in water supply (and possibly other 
sanitation services) would have a wider social impact if it came together with some measures. For 
instance, it could be made to serve poor customers by placing emphasis on tariff design, so that low 
income families were targeted more accurately. Political, social and cultural institutions or norms to 
monitor the private sector should be furthered. Right now they are almost non-existent. Municipalities 
and state agencies are the only entities in charge of enforcing concession contracts. Public opinion as well 
as people from inside the sanitation sector is generally opposed to privatization, but that alone can hardly 
be considered an effective way to monitor private sector participation. And finally, universal service 
obligations, currently absent from most concession contracts, could be negotiated with or even imposed 
on private providers. 
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8. Conclusion 
The provision of sanitation services in Brazil is by and large very deficient. As we discuss in this 
paper, the main problems can be found in rural areas and the poorest regions of the country, which 
usually display lower access rates and bear a greater burden from water and sewage bills. The poorer 
households also have difficulties accessing and paying for water.  
Nevertheless, there have been some improvements lately. That can be at least partially attributed 
to the investment and social policies implemented in the sector. Those policies have been mainly 
structured in the form of programs managed by different ministries. The main objective of most of those 
projects is to increase production capacity and coverage of water supply. Some of those programs have 
targeted projects aimed at increasing water supply and sanitation services for low-income families, while 
others were tailored to increase coverage and improve quality of service in rural areas. There has been 
relative success in that area, with coverage rates for the lowest three deciles having increased. This is 
indication that the poor have benefited from social policies put in place in the sanitation sector. In spite of 
the relative success of social policies in reducing inequality, the distribution of access across income 
deciles continues to be very uneven in Brazil. 
We argued that these social policies, mainly encouraging investments through loans have focused 
essentially at increasing coverage and neglecting the affordability issue. Policies that target affordability 
issues are essentially based on cross subsidies and increasing block tariffs, which allow companies to 
charge “social tariffs” to low income families, usually expressed in terms of a certain percentage of the 
full tariff. 
Despite the limited experience of PSP in the country, we showed that the private sector has 
managed to increase coverage. We also obtained some evidence that this improvement was more 
pronounced in municipalities at the bottom of the income (GDP) per capita spectrum. These results allow 
us to conjecture that low income households have benefited the most in that respect, since Brazil has a 
relatively high coverage rate in water provision (in comparison to other developing countries) and higher 
income families are usually the first to get access. A possibility worth investigating is if part of this result 
can be attributed to investment obligations assumed by private operators at the time they were granted 
their concessions. 
The impact of private provision on affordability, however, is not so clear, according to our results. 
There is some evidence that in municipalities with private operators water services are relatively less 
expensive, as measured by the share of GDP per capita taken up by water payments, but most of our 
econometric results in that respect were non-significant. 
In summary, the evidence and econometric results we brought forth support the case for greater 
presence of private undertakings in the water sector (and the sanitation sector in general), not only 
because the sector has a great demand for investments which cannot come entirely from the public sector, 
but also because private provision tends to improve access to the poor without creating an excessive 
financial burden on them. 
 
9. References 
 
Estache, Antonio, Andrés Gómez-Lobo, and Danny Leipziger. 2001. “Utilities Privatization and the Poor: 
Lessons and Evidence from Latin América.” World Development, Vol. 29, No. 7, pp. 1179-1198 
 
Fujiwara, Thomas. 2004. A Privatização Beneficia os Pobres? Os Efeitos da Desestatização do 
Saneamento Básico na Mortalidade Infantil. Paper presented at the 33rd Annual Meeting of The 
Brazilian Association of Post-Graduate Centers in Economics, Natal, 6-9 December. ANPEC, Rio de 
Janeiro. 
 
Galiani, Sebastian, Paul Gertler and Ernesto Schargrodsky. 2005. “Water for Life: The Impact of the 
Privatization of Water Services on Child Mortality.” The Journal of Political Economy, Vol. 113, No. 1, 
pp. 83-120. 
 
 23
Mello, Marina F. 2001. Privatização do Setor de Saneamento no Brasil: Quatro Experiências e muitas 
Lições. Discussion Paper No. 447, Economics Department PUC-Rio, Rio de Janeiro. 
 
Noll, Roger G., Mary Shirley and Simon Cowan. 2000. “Reforming Urban Water Systems in Developing 
Countries.” In Anne O. Krueger (ed.), Economic Policy Reform: The Second Stage. University of 
Chicago Press, Chicago. 
 
Owen, D. L. (2006). Pinsent Masons Water Yearbook, 2006-2007, London: Masons Solicitors. 
 
Parlatore, Antônio C. 2000. “A Privatização do Setor de Saneamento no Brasil.” In Armando C. Pinheiro 
and Kiichiro Fukasaku (eds.), A Privatização no Brasil: O Caso dos Serviços de Utilidade Pública. 
BNDES, Rio de Janeiro. 
 
Quintão, Marcelo. 2006. Setor de Saneamento Básico no Brasil: Características do Setor, Perfil de 
Acesso do Usuário e Participação da Iniciativa Privada. Monograph, UnB, Brasília. 
 
Rezende, F. C. 1996. “Políticas Públicas e Saneamento Básico: A Compesa entre o Estado e o Mercado.” 
Revista de Administração Pública, Vol. 30, No. 4, pp. 87-107. 
 
Seroa da Motta, R. 2004. Questões Regulatórias do Setor de Saneamento no Brasil. Technical Note No. 
5, IPEA, Rio de Janeiro. 
 
Seroa da Motta, R. and Ajax R.B. Moreira. 2004. Efficiency and Regulation in the Sanitation Sector in 
Brazil. Discussion Paper No. 1059, IPEA, Rio de Janeiro. 
 
Shleifer, Andrei. 1998. “State versus Private Ownership.” Journal of Economic Perspectives, Vol. 12, 
No. 4, pp. 133-150. 
 
Turolla, Frederico A. 2002. Política de Saneamento Básico: Avanços Recentes e Opções Futuras de 
Políticas Públicas. Discussion Paper No. 922, IPEA, Rio de Janeiro. 
 
Wooldridge, Jeffrey M. 2002. Econometric Analysis of Cross Section and Panel Data. The MIT Press, 
Cambridge, MA. 
 
 
 
